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THE NEW HISTORY OF RACE RELATIONS
Robert R . Dykstra. Bright Radical Star:  Black Freedom and White Supremacy on the
Hawkeye Frontier.  Cam bridge:  Harvard U niversity Press, 1993. xi + 270 pp.  Tables,
maps, appendices, notes, and index.  $47.50.
  Political h istory, some h istorians say , is dead.  C oncerned  on ly w ith the petty
squabbles of rich w hite men, irrelevant to the real lives of the deprived or less
favored, the territory of messy compromise, not lofty ideals, electoral and
legislative politics, in this view, is unworthy of much attention.  And the methods of
the "new political historians" of the 1960s and 70s -- the formulation of clear
hypotheses informed by explicit social scientific theories and their testing through
using statistical methods -- are elitist, pseudo-scientific (when "truth" is relative and
fleeting), inherently right-wing, and no fun to read about.  In a "postmodern" age,
better to write what you feel about "texts" (and anything and everything qualifies as
a text), always being careful to include some and preferably several of the
following words in your title:  gendered, cultural, republican, class, race, and
carniva l.
     Bob D ykstra's brilliant, readable, and profound new book not only reaffirms the
importance of politics and of the techniques and theories of social science history,
bu t it also  demonstrates that race re lations  and changes in those re lations  in
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Am erica cannot be rightly understood without such methods.  Far from  a parochial
study of an obscure, 99%  white state that is best viewed, vaguely and briefly, from
a transcontinental airplane, Dykstra's monograph is concerned  with the broadest
and deepest questions about our history -- how changes in social behavior and
attitudes come about and how  real they are.  N o one interested in nineteenth century
U.S. history or ethnic interactions should ignore it, and readers who take the book
seriously will learn and delight, and m ay change their opinions on what they
believe to be true about racial relations and even how  history ought to be done.
     Not only does Bright Radical Star prove that political history is alive and  very
well, but it also serves as the most impressive monograph yet in what seems to me a
new history of race relations, one that treats racially-oriented behavior as
profoundly important, but changeable; as shaped by law, not fixed by culture; and
as d ifferent from  and m ore significant than expressed attitudes on racial m atters.  It
is an optimistic book in two senses, one that should prove to a currently skeptical
age that racial and political change can be progressive and that the study of political
events can be central to history without depriving those less favored by past
societies of the attention that they deserve.
     W ithout taking a recorded vote, the 1839 legislature of the Iowa territory,
dominated by white farmers born in southern and border states, passed a
conventional black code banning African Am ericans from schools, the militia, the
ballot box, and testifying against whites in court.  The next year, the body corrected
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an oversight by forbidding interracial marriages.  Although initial efforts by
abolitionists to repeal these laws failed, by 1857, a state constitutional convention
authorized a  referendum  on  black  vo ting , in 1868, ano ther referendum actua lly
instituted impartial male suffrage, and in 1880, citizens repealed the remaining
anachronistic black laws in a third popular vote.  W hy Iowans bothered to pass such
laws in the first place and how and  why  the statutes were repealed are the central
questions that D ykstra exam ines, and  although  he  has scoured  every  conceivable
relevant qua litative sou rce , the three  referenda and  numerous leg islative  roll calls
form the chief data that he analyzes systematically.
     Although some historians have ignored or even denied it, Dykstra shows
convincingly that abolition ists after the  form ation of the A merican A ntislavery
Society in 1833 repea tedly ag itated against "black  laws" in Iowa and other sta tes. 
They had  to.  If colonization abroad w as too  costly and coercive to  succeed, as it
was, then abolition would mean that freedpeople would stay in the U.S. in some
status.  Antislavery could only become politically viable if abolitionists convinced
whites that emancipated slaves who enjoyed at least some civil rights posed no
threat to American society, and the best way to do this was to demonstrate that
blacks would responsibly exercise equal rights.  Thus, for abolitionists, ideals and
tactical considerations both pointed toward fostering the civil rights of free persons
of color.
     Iowa's abolitionists began  to act on th is understanding as early  as 1841 , two
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years after the passage of the Iowa territory 's first discrim inatory law s.  Quaker,
Congregationalist, and progressive Presbyterian villagers petitioned the legislature,
a sym pathetic W hig  forced the H ouse to vote  on  a repeal b ill, and a lthough the b ill
lost overwhelmingly, it served as the basis for fu ture agitation  by  loca l antislavery
societies, as well as the L iberty Party , which, D ykstra show s, attracted  alm ost all
the  abolitionist activists in the  state, and  a slow ly increasing  number of sympathetic
W hig politicians.  Dem ocrats almost uniformly opposed black civil rights, in Iowa
as elsewhere.
     Reacting against the continual abolitionist/Liberty agitation for the repeal of the
black law s, the 1844 statehood constitutional convention, 71%  of w hose m em bers
were  Dem ocrats , came very  close to banning b lacks from the  state entire ly.  T his
was no t a m easure that a ttracted  support from de legates w ho  were  even  very mildly
against slavery, but one sponsored by proslavery forces.  Thus, its chief proponent
captu red  his  constituents ' attitudes in  the  slogan "Slave or no negro." (59)  Despite
the fact that there were only about 300 African-Am ericans in the territory at the
time, an abolitionist petition against any black laws evinced from a constitutional
convention comm ittee a vision of a racial future that was as apocalyptic as any
farther Sou th:  
There a re s trong  reasons to induce the  be lief that the tw o
races could not exist in the same government upon an
equality w ithout d iscord and  vio lence, that migh t eventua te
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in insurrection, bloodshed and final extermination of one of
the two races.  No one can doubt that a degraded prostitution
of moral feeling would ensue; a tendency to amalgamate the
two races w ould be superinduced; a degraded and reckless
popu lation w ou ld follow; idleness, crim e and  misery wou ld
come in their train, and government itself fall into anarchy
and despotism . (57)  
After first endorsing exclusion, the convention rejected it by a vote of
35-33, largely  for fear that it m igh t cost Iowa votes for statehood in
Congress.  M issouri's request in 1819 had been held up for two years
on this ground, and an important 1837 judicial opinion by Supreme
Court Justice Joseph Story implied that the Fourth Am endment
privileges and  immunities clause prohib ited such  depriva tions of rights
by the states.  In fact, Florida's statehood request, considered by
Congress at the same time as Iowa's, was delayed by New E ngland
mem bers on exactly these grounds.
     The convention's rhetoric and actions were not the only signs of
how much abo litionists had  to overcome in  what Dykstra calls
"perhaps the most racially conservative free s tate in the U nion." (239) 
In 1849, Quakers from the village of Salem were tried, convicted, and
fined $2900 for helping some M issouri slaves to escape.  Iowa was the
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only northern state whose two senators voted for the 1850 Fugitive
Slave L aw, and the state's most prominent W hig new spaper editor lost
his job for criticizing that law.  In 1851, the legislature actually passed
a black exclusion law, but its effectiveness was limited by a clever
legislative  trick  tha t Dykstra charm ing ly e luc ida tes.  (How  could
anyone  have  ever though t tha t abolitionists w ere  ind ifferen t to
institutions or unwilling to try to m anipulate them?)
     Nonetheless, in 1854, the Kansas-Nebraska Act suddenly ignited
the state, finally driving the Free Soilers into a coalition with the
W higs and thrusting the coalition into control of the governorship and
General Assembly.  W hat accounted for this upsurge, after so many
years of frustration and despair for Iowa abolitionists, Dykstra does
not really explain.  The temperance issue and a small Know -Nothing
movement arrived at approximately the same time as the anti-Nebraska
crusade, almost no Liberty or Free Soil activists in Iowa becam e
Know-Noth ings, and  since slavery and b lack c ivil rights  issues split
the state's small Know -Nothing movement, Republicanism could not
have been a p roduct of nativism  in the s tate.  
     Rather than  one issue driving  the o thers , Dykstra thinks m idcentury
men, "informed by evangelical religious belief," were moved  "to fuse
varied programs of uplift into one grand strategy of universal
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em ancipation"  in the R epub lican party . (125)  He supports th is
assertion  through  a detailed  analysis o f the positions of leg islators in
1851  and 1855 on b lack law issues, show ing  tha t the  pa tterns of their
support correlated almost perfectly with party and votes on liquor
issues, and, to a lesser extent, with age, religious tendency, and
occupation.  Dem ocrats and wets were anti-black, and Republicans
and drys, much less so.  Younger men and m embers of pietist denom-
inations tended to oppose black laws som ewhat more than older men
and relig ious liturgicals did.  M erchants  usua lly jo ined the D em ocratic
party, while artisans tended to become R epublicans.  The social
correlates of vote choices among the m asses of citizens, Dykstra
show s through a  de tailed com parison o f election returns w ith
demographic statistics, were similar to those of legislators.  By 1856,
the proximity of the brutal slavery struggle in Kansas turned out 85%
of Iowa's voters, who backed the openly antislavery Republicans by
56% -44%.
     As early as 1855, Iowa's tiny black population, led by A lexander
Clark of M uscatine, petitioned the legislature to repeal the law that
supposedly banned them  from  the s tate, and by 1857, they w ere
agitating for suffrage and entry into public schools.  In response, the
state's Republican-dominated 1857 C onstitutional Convention rejected
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a motion requiring school segregation, leaving it to the courts to decide
whether no m ention  of race a t all m eant that A frican  Americans cou ld
or could  no t be  denied entry in to any  particu lar schoo l, timidly
submitted the question of racially impartial suffrage to a vote of the
people separate from ratification of the rest of the Constitution, and
rejected a clause prohibiting black emigration, an issue which for the
firs t tim e split the D em ocrats.  
     The convention's extensive discussion of racial discrimination and
prejudice and Dykstra's extensive analysis of roll call voting in the
body undercut any notion that there was a white consensus on such
matters.  Although admitting some personal prejudice, the
convention's most liberal delegate, R.L.B. Clarke, favored a
constitution "free from  all invidious personal distinctions, and based
upon universal suffrage," even if it damaged the fortunes of the
Republican party.  The slightly more moderate W illiam P enn Clarke
balked only at mandating equal suffrage, and that not from any m atter
of principle, but from fear that the public might punish the Repub-
licans and even defeat the Constitution because of it.  No R epublican
asserted a belief in the innate inferiority of African Am ericans, but
only that slavery had  deg raded  them  and taught whites prejudice. 
Even John Edw ards, son of a Louisiana slaveholder who had grown up
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in that state, but was now an antislavery Republican, voted for several
of the b lack rights provisions.  In  contrast, all of the conven tion's
Dem ocrats resisted any state-provided schooling for blacks, and they
solidly opposed the rights of African Am ericans to testify or vote and
even  a general sta temen t in the p ream ble that all m en  were "equal."
     The referendum confirmed Penn Clarke's judgment, as only 15%  of
those who cast a ballot on Proposition 2, the black suffrage provision,
favored it, and the Dem ocrats' racist campaign nearly brought down
the whole constitution.  Unlike in other states, and unlike in Iowa after
the w ar, Republican leaders feared  to endorse b lack  suffrage, and  there
was no  organized  campaign  for it.  Every man who  vo ted  Dem ocratic
in the 1856 election, Dykstra estimates, opposed impartial suffrage a
year later, while Republicans split, with two-thirds of those who
expressed an opinion favoring black voting, but nearly twice as many
abstaining as casting a ballot on the m easure.  New  Englanders, drys,
Quakers, and Presbyterians were the only groups to favor black
suffrage in 1857 in Iowa.  Although a Dem ocratic campaign stressing
the party's opposition to school integration failed to dislodge
Republicans from the statehouse later in the year, fear of getting too
far out in front of a racially conservative public did lead Republicans
in the subsequent legislature to abandon their opposition to requiring
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unanimous consent from w hite parents before allowing black children
to enter common schools.
     The C ivil War, in which 49% of Iowa's 1860 military-age men
served, completed the emancipation of the Republican party.  In 1865,
the state GO P convention endorsed racially impartial suffrage by
better than two to one, while Dem ocrats, who had been devastated by
the  desertion  of un ion ists from the ir ranks during  the  war, sough t to
revive their fortunes by organizing the "Union Anti-Negro Suffrage
party."  This time, the racial appeal failed, as more and more Repub-
lican leaders publicly approved what state Supreme Court Judge
Chester C. Cole called "God 's law of equality," and the voters ratified
the  new party line .  By 1866, b lack suffrage  had becom e so w idely
accepted by Iowa party activists that deviation on the issue cost
Congressman John Kasson renomination, only eight of the
eighty -three  Repub licans in the legis lature opposed  it, the state
convention virtually unanimously endorsed it, and the landslide for the
Republican ticket was even larger than in 1864 and 1865.  By 1868,
the state platform was referring to impartial suffrage as "a cardinal
principle of our political faith," 85% of the Republicans in the
legislature endorsed not only suffrage, but every other measure aiming
at racial equality, Judge Cole, acting in a case brought by Alex Clark,
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had declared school segregation illegal in Iowa, and black suffrage ran
only five percent behind Grant in the general election, winning 57%  of
the vote - about 90%  of those who backed Grant, but almost none of
the  supporters  of Horatio  Seymour.  By 1880, w hen the state
absentmindedly removed the last vestiges of the black laws from the
statute  books by referendum, those Dem ocrats  who  bo thered  to vote
still cast negative ballots, but two-thirds of the minority party did not
even vote, while Republicans recorded their franchises
overwhelmingly for equal rights.  Finally, Iowa whites had reached
something approaching a racial consensus:  black laws were either
undesirable  or irrelevant.
     Voters reached that consensus partly by conversion and partly by
turnover.  W hile two-thirds of the 1856 Fremont supporters who  voted
on Proposition 2 in 1857 supported it, these "yes" voters represented
only a quarter of the Fremont total, for the majority, apparently caught
be tween their own racism  and a  desire to support the  position o f their
most progressive party leaders, abstained.  In 1868, the former
Frem ont vo ters  who  rem ained  in the e lectorate  had been la rgely
converted , voting as a unit for b lack  suffrage, with less than a third
abstaining.  D em ocratic  vo ters  un til 1880  were  alw ays virtua lly
unanimously adverse.  Bu t those who had joined the electorate since
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1856, who com prised nearly half of the potential voters by 1868,
overw helming ly supported  black  rights , suggesting  tha t the  events
surrounding the Civil W ar and the courageous endorsements of equal
rights by Republican leaders had imprinted themselves on that genera-
tion.
     Dykstra ends with an explicit and fascinating discussion of the
connection of the nineteenth century Iowa experience with social
scientific theories of racial behavior change associated with Gunnar
M yrdal, Robert K. M erton, Gordon Allport, and Thomas Pettigrew.1 
Like  the  his torian  C. Vann W oodw ard , these social scientists
emphasize the importance of politics and authoritative laws in shaping
racial behavior, the superficiality of much white racism, and the
crucial impact of leadership in fostering change.2  A pessimistic view
that w hite A mericans have always been incorrigibly racist, Dykstra
conc ludes, "im plic itly dem eans the  courageous idealism of many indi-
viduals, both black and white, who fought for racial justice. . . . The
circum stances, processes, and s trategies that w on  frontier Iowans to
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the civil equality of blacks remind us that there are egalitarian
precedents as well as a racist tradition in Am erica's past." (270)
J. Morgan K ousser, Division of Hum anities and S ocial Sciences,
California Institute of Technology, is working on books on
contem porary minority vo ting rights and  on  nineteenth century court
cases on racial discrimination in schools.
